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What is Critique? Towards a Sociology of Disciplinary Heterodoxy  
in Contemporary International Law  
 
 
Akbar Rasulov* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
What is critique? Deciding how one should answer this question in many ways can be 
regarded as the contemporary international law scholar’s ultimate rite of passage. And for a good 
reason too. Think of this, if you will, as an ideological equivalent of the Rorschach blot: how you 
go about interpreting it - what angle you choose to tackle it from  - will reveal far more about 
where you stand, intellectually, politically, and institutionally, than what you ‘know’ about what 
critique ‘really means’. 
This essay seeks to make two main contributions to the current debate about the meaning of 
critical international law. In the first place, it aims to develop a general concept of critique as a 
system of academic practice. The ultimate goal here is to produce a theoretical model that would 
allow us to understand ‘critique’ not as a projection of some abstract Platonic entity, be it ‘leftism’, 
‘postmodernism’, or the Enlightenment, but as a historically determined articulation of a certain 
arrangement of socio-institutional patterns. What would happen to our understanding of the idea of 
critique in modern international law if we were to begin exploring it as a form of social practice, 
approaching it, in the final analysis, as nothing more than just a bundle of relatively stylized 
behavioural  patterns? What would happen to our sense of our professional roles and identities – as 
lawyers and as academics  – if we were to start recognising that what ultimately stands behind this 
idea is really just a certain way of organising the social division of labour within the legal-
academic community, a pattern whose main parameters are determined by the broader economy of 
the international legal-academic process and nothing more mysterious or grandiose than that? 
These and other related questions are covered for the most part in Section 2  of this essay.  
The narrative that I develop there starts  with a fairly simple claim: the concept of critique, I argue, 
describes, in the final analysis, a purely relational state of being. It has no inherent objective 
meaning. There is no fixed essential core behind it, no self-evident truth, no in-built content. 
Whatever content we associate with this concept in practice in each given instance is assigned to it 
only because it has been explicitly differentiated from whatever other content we come to 
associate at the same time with the respective idea of the mainstream. Going by this logic, what 
makes something – a text, a theoretical tradition, a scholarly position – ‘critical’ in the eyes of 
contemporary international legal studies can never be properly explained if we only focus our 
attention on exploring the respective ideas, themes, or broader political programmes for which this 
text, tradition, or position serves as an expressive vehicle. To be ‘critical’ in the context of the 
international legal discipline means simply being entered into a certain pattern of relationship – a 
form of Saussurean differentiation – with whatever it is that at that time counts as the disciplinary 
orthodoxy, the ‘dogma’, or the ‘mainstream’, nothing more, nothing less. Or, to put it in a slightly 
different manner:  there exists, in the final analysis, no principled difference in this context 
between critique and heterodoxy. Both categories refer to the exact same phenomenon, the essence 
                                                 
* School of Law, University of Glasgow. The writing of this essay has benefited from various conversations I have had 
over the years with David Kennedy, Arnulf Becker Lorca, Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Duncan Kennedy, Umut 
Ozsu, John Haskell, Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, Robert Cryer, Scott Newton, and Christian Tams. All errors and 
omissions are mine alone.  
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of which consists in ‘being related to but also remaining different from whatever presently counts 
as the mainstream/orthodoxy’. Looking at it from this angle, it follows, furthermore, that there 
appears to be, ultimately, nothing self-evidently progressive or theoretically sophisticated about 
the critical international law tradition in the broader scheme of things. Some critical projects 
challenge the mainstream from the left; others do so from the right. Some do it in ways that are 
nuanced, intellectually provocative, and stimulating; others in ways that can at best only be 
described as blunt, tired, and unimaginative. When all is said and done, John Bolton, it will have to 
be recognised, has been as much of a critic of the disciplinary establishment in contemporary 
international law and its discursive and ideological conventions as Martti Koskenniemi or Anne 
Orford. 
The second main contribution which this essay seeks to make concerns the question of 
historical lessons. Basing on the theories developed in Section 2 of this essay, in Sections 3 and 4 I 
propose to undertake an initial exploration of what for lack of a better description one might call 
the operative conditions of failure and success applicable to the workings of disciplinary 
heterodoxies in contemporary international law.  Given the general space constraints, this part of 
my inquiry will be limited to only one practical case-study, the so-called ‘new approaches to 
international law’ (NAIL) movement, whose general institutional trajectory I will review in 
Section 3 of this essay. The reasons which inspired this choice should not be hard to deduce.  For 
good or ill, in the eyes of most international lawyers over the last twenty years the concept of 
critique has been de facto synonymized with the NAIL movement. Though it seems possible today 
to speak of NAIL without ever invoking the idea of critical international law, it seems quite 
impossible to do the reverse. At the same time, given NAIL’s unprecedentedly large – for a 
heterodox tradition – impact on the evolution of the discipline’s general intellectual environment, 
its ‘local history’ also offers an incomparably rich opportunity to explore and analyse the broader 
structure of the heterodox institutional process in modern international law in general. Think of 
this, if you will, as an example of Ginzburg’s Ansatzpunkt: that special individual case which can 
be used as an epistemological platform from which to grasp the meaning and contents of some 
much broader historical phenomenon.1  
The idea of looking at international law as a set of social and institutional practices, is not, of 
course, an entirely novel proposition. At the most immediate level, the research agenda which I 
develop in this essay can be seen as the direct descendant of the kind of investigative projects that 
were first initiated in the late 1990s by David Kennedy – see in particular his Thinking against the 
Box2 and The Disciplines of International Law and Policy.3 A considerable (even if not always 
obvious) theoretical debt is also owed in these pages to the scholarship of Jack Schlegel4  and 
Pierre Schlag.5 More generally, the methodology I adopt here can also be traced to the writings of 
the French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu6 as well as to Louis Althusser’s work on knowledge as a 
productive system.7 From a general Bourdieusian point of view, what I present here can be 
understood, essentially, as an attempt to develop a theory of international legal critique as a field of 
                                                 
1 See Carlo Ginzburg, ‘Latitude, Slaves, and the Bible: An Experiment in Microhistory’ (2005) 31 Critical Inquiry 665 
Carlo Ginzburg, Threads and Traces (University of California Press: 2012) 193-214. 
2 David Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box’ (2000) 32 NYUJ Int’l L&Pol at 335.  
3 David Kennedy, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’ (1999) 12 LJIL at 9.  
4 See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995). 
5 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, ‘The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong’ (1987) 39 Stanford Law Review 917. 
6 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Field Of Cultural Production (Columbia University Press, 1993). 
7 See, e.g., Louis Althusser, ‘From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy’, in Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading 
Capital 13 (New Left Press, 1970). 
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restricted cultural production;8 from an Althusserian point of view, as an attempt to decipher the 
internal dynamics which governs the workings of critical international law as a system of social 
relations. The immediate labels, though interesting to explore in their own right, do not matter so 
much, in the end, as the underlying logic of investigation. 
 
 
2. The Sociology of Academic Production in Contemporary International Law:  
Some General Remarks 
 
 
2.1  Materialism and Idealism  
 
 
The question ‘what defines the idea of critique in international law?’ has long attracted the 
attention of international law scholars. For reasons that probably have as much to do with the 
trivial force of habit as with anything else, the vast majority of attempts to explore it to date, 
however, seem to have proceeded in one of two ways. Either the proposed account has tended to 
focus mostly on detailing the most significant intellectual contributions made by critical 
international law scholarship the development of international legal thought. The list of usual 
suspects here would typically include the so-called ‘indeterminacy thesis’, ‘the linguistic turn’, 
‘critique of Eurocentrism’, etc. Or the main pride of place, analytically, has been assigned to what 
would be typically understood as the most common thematic motifs characteristic of the critical 
international law literature as a whole: ‘fondness for interdisciplinarity’, ‘writing about theory, not 
practice’, ‘taking a negative view of international law’s redemptive potential’, etc.9  
In both cases, the essential effect has been to reduce the phenomenon of critique to some 
kind of abstract disembodied fetish: a metonymic expression of some grand transcendental entity 
hovering imperiously in the background. Whatever set of features is supposed on this view of 
things to separate critique from the rest of the disciplinary field around it is, thus, always 
understood to be a mere projection of some latent, exterior essence that silently governs the 
evolution of the international legal discipline and its constituent material processes and ideological 
conflicts, like some kind of small-time Hegelian Weltgeist. In this essay I propose to challenge the 
continuing dominance of this unreconstructedly idealist tradition of approaching the study of the 
                                                 
8 ‘The field of [cultural] production … owes its … structure to the opposition between the field of restricted 
production as a system producing cultural goods (and the instruments for appropriating these goods) objectively 
destined for a public of producers of cultural goods, and the field of large-scale cultural production, specifically 
organized with a view to the production of cultural goods destined for non-producers of cultural goods, “the public at 
large”. In contrast to [the latter], which submits to the laws of competition for the conquest of the largest possible 
market, the field of restricted production tends to develop its own criteria for the evaluation of its products, thus 
achieving the truly cultural recognition accorded by the peer group whose members are both privileged clients and 
competitors.’ Bourdieu, supra n. 6, at 115 (emphasis added). 
9 For various illustrations, see, among others, Christine Schwöbel, ‘Introduction’, in Christine Schwöbel (ed.), Critical 
Approaches to International Criminal Law 1 (Routledge 2014); Tor Krever, International Criminal Law: An Ideology 
Critique, 26 LJIL 701, 704-7 (2013); Frederic Megret, ‘Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights 
Stand? An Exploration in 18 Vignettes’, in Jose-Maria Beneyto and David Kennedy (eds.), New Approaches to 
International Law 3 (The Hague: TMC Asser 2012); Thomas Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law 
Discourse (The Hague: TMC Asser 2010) 22-38; China Mieville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of 
International Law (Leiden: Brill 2005) at 48-60; Jason Beckett, ‘Countering Uncertainty and Ending Up/Down 
Arguments: Prolegomena to a Response to NAIL’ (2005) 16 EJIL at 213; Deborah Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: 
Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law’ (1996) 65 NJIL at 341; Anthony Carty, ‘Critical International Law: 
Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law’ (1991) 2 EJIL at 66;Nigel Purvis, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public 
International Law’ (1991) 32 HILJ at 81. 
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internal workings of the international legal discipline. The way to do this begins, firstly, by 
displacing this tired combination of quasi-Hegelian approaches – can anyone today really take 
seriously the view that it is the evolution of abstract ideas (or styles of writing about them) that 
determines the march of history? – and, secondly, by outlining a fundamentally materialist theory 
of critique and its role and place in the international legal discipline.  
In the pages below, I propose to recast the concept of international legal critique – and, with 
it, the concomitant idea of international legal heterodoxy – as, essentially, a placeholder category 
whose main discursive function consists in simply designating the existence within the broader 
social field of the international legal discipline of a certain pattern of socio-institutional 
arrangements , that is to say, a certain pattern of social roles, whose immediate configuration can 
be understood, in the final analysis, only in the light of the corresponding structure of institutional 
resource distribution and the related dynamics of conflicts permeating the internal social landscape 
of the international legal discipline.  
What sort of resources and what kind of conflicts are we talking about here? I address both 
of these questions in greater detail in Section 2(4). For now, however, let me just add a couple of 
points concerning the issue of methodology. As I have noted earlier, the methodological 
orientation which I advocate in this essay falls generally under the rubric of the so-called 
materialist tradition of inquiry. This does not mean that it should be understood, however, as 
implying any kind of vulgar determinist theories of intellectual life or academic history.  The 
argument that I make in this essay is both far more ‘modest’ in terms of its explanatory ambitions 
and far more ‘post-structuralist’ in terms of its general onto-theoretic presumptions than that.  
Analytically, my principal starting assumptions in these pages can be understood as a 
combination of the following three points: (i) there appears to exist an obvious pattern of 
correlation between the way the most important ideational and discursive structures in 
contemporary international legal discourse have developed and transformed over time and the way 
the operative structure of the underlying academic institutional processes has changed and 
evolved over the same period;10 (ii) judging from the available evidence, the two processes seem 
to be causally linked and on the whole it seems to be the latter of them which as the ‘chief 
determining instance’ of the former, not the other way around; and so (iii) to understand the 
evolution of those ideational and discursive structures most fully, it makes sense, therefore, to try 
to grasp first how the basic dynamics of these underlying academic institutional processes tends to 
work and why.  
Note the emphasis placed on the words ‘academic’ and ‘institutional’. Just as it is not the 
movement of abstract ideas and discursive patterns that dictates the course of international law’s 
disciplinary evolution, so, too, it is not the march of events outside of it. To be sure, the chief 
determining instance in academic history always has to be sought in the domain of the underlying 
social relations; but it is the internal social relations  that we need to look at in this context. Think 
of this, if you will, as a local variation on Althusser’s relative autonomy thesis: in order to explain 
the history of any given academic discipline, our best bet epistemologically is to focus the thrust of 
our inquiry on the evolution of the respective disciplinary field’s internal institutional patterns and 
structures, before we start looking anywhere beyond it.11 And insofar as most disciplinary 
production in international law today happens within a decidedly academic institutional context, 
what this basically means in practice is that all our investigations of international law’s internal 
                                                 
10 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford University Press, 1988) xvii: ‘[There exists ] an almost perfect 
homology between the space of the stances (conceived as a space of forms, styles and modes of expression as much as 
of contents expressed) and the space of positions held by their authors in the field of [academic] production.’   
11 See Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) 134-5. 
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disciplinary history must inevitably begin with an inquiry into the evolution of the corresponding 
institutional structures at the heart of the international legal-academic process.  
Not that this means, of course, that any developments taking place in the ‘external world’ 
should therefore be dismissed as entirely irrelevant. Exogenous factors certainly do influence the 
course of international law’s disciplinary history – where would the Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL), for example, be without decolonization? – but even so they do not 
constitute its primary engine of change. 12    
 
 
2.2  Sociology of Continuities and Sociology of Conflicts 
 
 
Most recent accounts of the disciplinary history of international law, where they have turned 
to the investigation of what one may broadly call the sociological component of that history,13 
have tended to focus on studying the development of the discipline’s common horizons of 
imagination, or what Martti Koskenniemi at the start of The Gentle Civilizer of Nations  calls the 
‘sensibility’ of the international law profession. 14 The privileged order of events which they place 
at the centre of their investigative protocols is thus found mostly in the evolution of the 
discipline’s basic patterns of collective consciousness, or, which is essentially the same thing, the 
continuities in the evolution of its various epistemological, political, and ideological consensuses.  
The approach which I advance in this essay proceeds from a completely different 
perspective. Rather than tracing the evolution of various intra-disciplinary consensuses and 
continuities, I take as my principal analytical premise the view that (i) the key to the study of any 
kind of disciplinary history lies in the evolution of that discipline’s general pattern of internal 
social conflicts and contradictions; and (ii) the most helpful clues to the discovery of this pattern 
come from the study of what in the Marxist tradition one would call the distribution of the primary 
means of disciplinary production, or, to use a slightly different theoretical vernacular, the principal 
forms of academic capital (AC) valent within that disciplinary field.  
 
 
2.3  Critique and Heterodoxy as Social Practices 
 
 
What are the main theoretical implications of the ‘sociology of conflicts’ approach? What 
broader assumptions about the practical workings of critical and heterodox legal traditions does 
this approach imply as part of its theoretical pre-givens?  
Implication 1: Both ‘critique’ and ‘heterodoxy’ are purely contingent categories. Each 
describes what in effect is only a relatively regularized pattern of conduct expected from the 
occupants of certain social positions. The essence of this conduct consists in its conflictual and 
oppositional orientation. Beyond that, neither label has any determinate meaning. There is no 
                                                 
12‘For Marxism the explanation of any phenomenon is in the last instance internal: it is the internal “contradiction” 
which the “motor”. The external circumstances are active: but [only] “through” the internal contradiction which they 
overdetermine.’ Louis Althusser, ‘Essays in Self-Criticism’ (1976) n. 2, at 80, 
13 See, eg, Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2011); Martti Koskenniemi, 
The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics (2007) 70 MLR 1; Scott Newton, ‘The 
Dialectics of Law and Development’, in David Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds.), The New Law and Economic 
Development  (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 174. 
14 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 2. 
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stable essence behind them, no in-built political agenda, no fixed theoretical content. Anything that 
seeks to challenge and oppose that which at the present point counts as the mainstream/orthodoxy 
deserves to be included under the rubric of critique/heterodoxy. Other than this, there is not much 
to be said about the meaning of either concept at the abstract level .  
Implication 2: Not all critical/heterodox traditions derive from the same theoretico-
discursive quarters. Some critiques/heterodoxies challenge and oppose the mainstream/orthodoxy 
from the left, others do so from the right. Determining which side of the political spectrum any 
given critique/heterodoxy comes from, furthermore, is a task that can only be resolved in the 
context of the respective discipline’s internal social landscape at a particular point in time.  
Put differently, it does not make any sense to try to settle this question in abstracto, nor to 
try to decipher the ideological signatures of field-specific critical/heterodox phenomena by 
mapping them onto some externally validated system of coordinates, such as leftism tout court or 
‘the reactionary mind in general’. The first exercise is fundamentally pointless; the second, for the 
most part, a waste of time. It may certainly seem tempting to hope that someday it should be 
possible to discover one single measurement scale that could be applied directly to all the different 
socio-institutional and discursive domains across which we conduct our social lives. Both reason 
and experience, however, suggest that one should not make too much of this prospect. Just because 
a given critical/heterodox tradition positions itself within the context of the international legal 
landscape on what would normally count as the intra-disciplinary left, it does not follow at all that 
it should have achieved this effect by adopting as part of its analytical apparatus or discursive 
conventions the same theoretico-conceptual repertoire that one would typically associate with 
leftwing radical movements in other socio-institutional landscapes. To expect anything different 
would be a mark of Hegelian idealism.  
Implication 3: Heterodoxy, to paraphrase Edward Said, is in itself neither an institution, nor 
a discipline: it exists only because of the heterodoxes who practice it.15 Devoid of any intrinsic 
content, the concept of heterodoxy, thus, describes an ontological condition which consists only in 
a certain set of social practices carried out by the respective groups of international lawyers vis-à-
vis one another, in the light of their shared experience of their discipline’s broader ideological 
structure.  
A slightly different way of putting this would be to say that the concept of heterodoxy 
essentially covers all that which is consistently socialised in open opposition to whatever at that 
point in time is commonly perceived, within the respective discipline’s social setting, as the 
disciplinary mainstream or orthodoxy. Note the way the word ‘socialised’ is being used here: 
heterodoxies are socialised to perceive themselves as being different from the orthodoxies; this 
does not mean that the underlying process of socialisation itself is executed differently. At the end 
of the day, all heterodoxies in contemporary international law work according to the exact same 
set of operative laws and conditions as the respective orthodoxies. The only thing which changes is 
the immediate current location occupied by the given school or tradition within the field’s broader 
landscape.  
Or, to put it a little more bluntly: if one takes at all seriously the traditional Marxist argument 
that revolutions can only take place when the actual structure of the underlying social relations 
itself undergoes fundamental transformation, then, for all the countless disciplinary heterodoxies 
that have emerged in the field of international legal studies over the years, it follows that the 
history of the international legal discipline has never as yet seen a truly revolutionary movement or 
tradition .  
Implication 4: Every heterodox legal tradition shares the same field of events and processes 
– and, thus, is also bound by the exact same set of institutional trends and preconditions – as the 
                                                 
15 See Edward Said, Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) 165. 
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rest of the international legal discipline. The mechanisms of constitution and reproduction 
deployed in the creation, maintenance, and transformation of any given heterodox tradition are 
fundamentally indistinguishable from those which govern the constitution and reproduction of 
other, more mainstream disciplinary traditions. The practical workings of any given heterodox 
tradition, be it NAIL or the New Haven school of international law, in this sense, are entirely 
indistinguishable from the practical workings of the corresponding mainstream traditions. Put 
differently, there is nothing special or unique about critical and heterodox traditions as traditions: 
the crits are no different in this regard from the formalists, the positivists from the  
postcolonialists, the feminist legal tradition from the law-and-economics movement. The contents 
of their writings and teachings may differ considerably, but the operative logics at the root of their 
actual social and institutional practices do not – with one big exception: when it comes to those 
practices whose logics are determined by the terms of the broader social contract concluded 
between the discipline of international law and the world outside it, each heterodoxy can afford to 
break that contract a lot more freely than the corresponding orthodoxy.  
 
 
2.4  The Logic of the Academic Process: Three Laws of Academic Capital Accumulation 
according to the Sociology of Conflicts Approach 
 
 
There are a number of important analytical distinctions that need to be made to help us grasp 
more clearly the next part of the argument.  
The first distinction concerns the basic opposition between what might be called localised 
forms of academic capital (AC) – such as, eg, control over the appointments process or the 
awarding of research grants at the level of one single university – and the more systemic, or ‘de-
territorialised’, forms of AC – such as, eg, control over the editorial decisions in leading 
publications or the governing councils of the learned societies. The reason why this distinction is 
important is that it helps us formulate more precisely the first structural law that governs the 
evolutionary chances of every given disciplinary tradition: the law of the simultaneous 
augmentation of volume and diversification of forms of academic resources. No disciplinary 
tradition, movement, or school can survive in the long run if it does not accumulate sufficient 
stocks of local academic capital at each given university or research centre where it aims to 
implant itself. At the same time, no movement, tradition, or school will be able to expand its reach 
or reproduce itself successfully across generations if it does not simultaneously accumulate 
extensive stocks of de-territorialised institutional resources. Stated in these terms, the relative 
prospects of survival and success for any given disciplinary tradition over time can be understood 
as a function both of its overall volume of AC holdings and the degree to which these holdings 
remain internally diversified – or, as Bourdieu puts it, ‘the global volume of capital held (all the 
different species of capital … lumped together) [and] the structure of this capital (as defined by the 
relative weight of the different species).’16  
The second analytical distinction concerns the opposition between what one might call those 
forms of AC whose valence derives directly from international law’s specific condition as an 
academic discipline and those forms of AC whose valence generally does not depend on the 
specific features of the international legal discipline as such.  
Under the first heading, it seems useful to distinguish four different categories of 
institutional resources:17  
                                                 
16 Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words (Stanford University Press, 1990) 117. 
17 Cf. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, n.10, at 39-40. 
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(i) control over faculty appointments and promotions and the constitution and funding 
of graduate research programmes;  
(ii) disbursement and accumulation of research grants and fellowships (such as,  eg, 
Cambridge and Oxford JRFs), scholarly prizes (such as,  eg, the ASIL Certificate of Merit), and 
career achievement indicators (such as,  eg, the membership in the Institut de droit international);  
(iii) membership of the editorial boards of the leading international law journals, 
external examining committees (especially in the case of doctoral programmes), and the governing 
councils of learned and professional societies (such as, eg, the ESIL);  
(iv) control over the key publication sites (such as, eg, the American Journal of 
International Law or the Revue generale de droit international public) and general networks for 
the dispersal of academic discursive output (such as, eg, the Oxford University Press or Dalloz).   
Under the second heading, it also seems possible to distinguish four basic categories of 
resources:  
(i) general financial resources conceived primarily as the ability to secure long-term 
large-scale funding to enable the given movement’s continuous participation in the general 
academic process, as manifested, eg, through the publication of genre-defining texts, the 
organization and attendance of conferences, the implementation of graduate programmes designed 
to train and prepare the next generation of the movement’s members as well as to equip them with 
the requisite academic credentials so as to enable them to secure attractive appointments, etc.;  
(ii) general ideological resources conceived as the ability to negotiate successfully the 
formal institutional divides between the world of academia and the world of popular media, on the 
one hand, and between the world of academia and the realm of public politics, on the other; 
(iii) general bureaucratic and managerial resources conceived essentially as a 
combination of practical skills and organisational experience relating to the know-how of the 
general academic process and the specific forms of organisational capital relating to the efficient 
management of complexly territorialised institutional networks and the development of effective 
structures of internal (for that movement) decision-making;  
(iv) general human resources conceived essentially as the combination of the quantity 
and quality of active participants: leaders, rank-and-file members, ‘acolytes’, support staff, fellow 
travellers, allies and sympathisers, etc.  
The crucial point that has to be noted is that with regard to the first group – the discipline-
specific resources – each of the listed categories can be regarded not only as a representation of a 
certain set of institutional sites or processes but also as a manifestation of what in the language of 
the Actor-Network Theory one would call a self-enclosed material semiotic regime.18 That is to 
say, each of these rubrics can be effectively understood as a representation of a more or less 
autonomous system of social practices that operates in the mode of symbolic economy.19 The 
same, however, cannot be inferred about any of the categories that form part of the second group 
(non-discipline-specific resources). 
 
**** 
                                                 
18 A material semiotic regime is a regime that consists of socially conditioned material practices which carry and 
transmit ‘second-order meanings’ (Lotman). In other words, how we position ourselves vis-à-vis such practices always 
sends a message quite separate from the immediate content of what ‘gets done’ or ‘is depicted’ within those practices 
(Barthes). For a general overview of the Actor-Network Theory, see further John Law, After Method: Mess in Social 
Science Research (New York: Psychology Press, 2004); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social (Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
19 For Bourdieu’s account of the basic logic of symbolic economy, see Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the 
Theory of Action (Stanford University Press, 1998) 92-122 
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The third important distinction that needs to be made as part of this theoretical ground-
clearing exercise is the distinction between those institutional conditions which apply with equal 
force to all disciplinary movements, traditions, and schools, heterodoxies and orthodoxies alike, 
and those which tend to affect the heterodox schools and traditions in a decidedly different manner 
compared to the way they affect the disciplinary orthodoxies.  One way to explain how this 
distinction tends to manifest itself in practice would be to connect the ideas of orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy to the Wallersteinian topography of core-periphery relations.20 Looking at the practices 
of academic production from this angle, the basic argument could then be summarised this way: 
those disciplinary movements and traditions which secure the longest control over the discipline’s 
core sites of production can extract, by virtue of their occupation of these sites, a whole range of 
additional rents which are never going to be available to those traditions that remain stuck within 
the discipline’s socio-institutional periphery.  
How exactly does this dynamic work? In a nutshell, the pattern goes something like this. It is 
a fairly self-evident fact that every disciplinary orthodoxy, simply by virtue of its occupation of the 
discipline’s institutional centre-stage, tends to benefit from a considerable reduction in the costs of 
its socio-institutional reproduction. Both in terms of the various costs associated with the 
recruitment of new members and in terms of the various costs related to the proliferation of its 
discursive-ideological outputs, it regularly avoids many of the burdens borne by its heterodox 
rivals, not least in the field of graduate research funding.  
To use a familiar example: neoclassical positivism (NCP) a la mode Ian Brownlie would not, 
all things being equal, have to ‘worry’ so much about its ability to secure generous PhD grants in 
order to attract sufficient numbers of top-class doctoral students to ensure its survival and 
reproduction across generations as, say, the feminist legal tradition (FLT) or Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), thanks to the fact that, unlike the latter two, it has 
succeeded over the last several decades in gaining a considerable measure of presence at places 
like Oxford and Cambridge. Because of their traditionally high reputation, it can be assumed that 
bright, ambitious students will always apply to Oxbridge doctoral programmes. What is more, a 
sufficiently large proportion of them will also be prepared to do so even in the absence of any 
funding support, on the understanding that whatever financial burden this might create for them in 
the short run would almost certainly be outweighed by the significant improvement in their future 
career possibilities brought by the acquisition of an Oxbridge degree. At the same time, because 
they proceed to pursue their studies at Oxbridge, their ability to attract grant funding from external 
grant-giving institutions (say, a government scholarship scheme), all things being equal, would 
also usually turn out to be significantly higher than that of their peers looking to fund their 
doctoral studies at lower-rated institutions. Putting these patterns together, it follows that the need 
for the NCP network to establish a steady stream of grants financed from its ‘internal’ resources 
will be considerably lower, in proportionate terms, than it would be for TWAIL or the FLT. The 
NCP, in other words, will simply not feel the same pressure to go out of its way to provide 
additional financial incentives to its PhD cadre to entice them to join and stay with the NCP 
tradition, since it will always-already have a fairly well-established supply of high-quality PhD 
student material. This means, among various other things, that it will therefore be able, at this 
point, to reduce the amount of institutional efforts it would otherwise have expended on the 
maintenance of its inter-generational reproduction programme. In the same situation in which 
other, less centrally placed disciplinary traditions would have to direct a significant proportion of 
                                                 
20 I borrow this idea from Diego Lopez Medina and Duncan Kennedy. See Diego Lopez Medina, Comparative 
Jurisprudence: Reception and Misreading of Trasnational Legal Theory in Latin America (SJD Thesis, Harvard Law 
School, 2001); Duncan Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000’, in Trubek and 
Santos, n.13, at 19.  
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their institutional resources towards the acquisition and disbursement of grants for their PhD cadre, 
the NCP tradition will thus find itself in the position where it will be able to re-funnel those 
resources towards other investment possibilities. The energy and organizational talents that would 
otherwise have been spent on negotiating the distribution of PhD grants among different social 
science departments (as well as among different traditions within the law department) can now be 
reallocated towards, eg, the organisation and financing of high-profile conferences, summer 
schools, new publications, interdisciplinary partnerships, strategic excursions into the realm of 
public media, etc.  
Nor are these all the rents which the NCP movement is going to be able to extract in this 
situation. The fact that the institutional prestige of universities like Oxford and Cambridge can 
secure every movement present within their boundaries a steady supply of top-quality student 
material will also create a whole range of other highly attractive opportunities that the NCP 
tradition will be able to take advantage of that TWAIL and the FLT respectively will not. In the 
first instance, the ability to work with the best students and to enjoy the benefits of the reallocation 
of institutional resources towards conferences, publications, media work, etc. will usually 
strengthen the general interest and commitment among that segment of the NCP’s academic 
community which from the career-affiliational point of view can be considered the most 
disciplinarily mobile, i.e. those entrepreneurial types who under a different set of circumstances 
would have been in the best position to switch successfully to another disciplinary tradition (eg 
international relations) or even a different professional path (civil society, government, etc.). The 
continued retention of these entrepreneurial talents in the long run is likely to bring a considerable 
increase in the inflow of external funding (eg, through the Leverhulme or the Marie Curie 
fellowship schemes) as well as the expansion of NCP’s general ideological reach (eg, through 
regular appearances on the CNN or the appointment to the UK Attorney General’s Public 
International Law panels of counsel). Both of these trends over time are likely to result in the  
steady improvement of NCP’s overall bureaucratic and managerial capital stocks. The steady 
enhancement of its organizational and ideological resources, in turn, will enable the NCP to pursue 
a greater range of high-profile disciplinary initiatives as well as to entrench a greater number of 
individual NCP scholars across the key disciplinary institutional sites, which in turn will help 
attract the attention of further potential graduate students, the external funding community, and the 
ideological allies – and thus ad infinitum.21    
A different way of describing this pattern would be to say that the occupiers of the 
disciplinary core typically tend to benefit a lot more than the occupiers of the disciplinary 
periphery from the effects of the second law of academic capital accumulation, the general law of 
institutional resource convertibility, which states, essentially, that any given species of AC can, 
under certain circumstances, be converted into another species of AC: high career-achievement 
indicators can be used to improve one’s position in the struggle for research grants; general 
ideological capital can ‘finance’ the attainment of membership of the learned societies’ governing 
councils, etc.  
The more efficiently one species of AC can be converted into another species in the 
particular institutional context – and it needs to be noted, of course, that the law of resource 
convertibility does not always work smoothly, and it certainly does not work instantaneously – the 
more swiftly the respective movement or tradition can make up for whatever shortages or 
imbalances in its capital structure it may have developed otherwise. The more regularly a given 
movement or tradition can benefit from the law of resource convertibility, the greater becomes its 
                                                 
21 I develop this point in more detail in Akbar Rasulov, ‘New Approaches to International Law: Images of a 
Genealogy’, in Jose-Maria Beneyto and David Kennedy (eds.), New Approaches to International Law (The Hague: T 
M C Asser, 2012) 151, at 175-7. 
11 
 
capacity for large-scale tactical and strategic manoeuvres, including those required in order to 
secure the reformulation of the standard protocols of intra-disciplinary knowledge-production to 
its advantage, i.e. in ways that would be most profitable to its accumulated knowledge stocks, 
theoretical resources, and current human talent. Simply by occupying the core sites of disciplinary 
production mainstream disciplinary traditions can thus, in effect, make the disciplinary structure 
work on their behalf – and against the respective heterodoxies’ interests.22 
 
 
**** 
 
But here now comes an interesting complication: in the old Kantian taxonomy of academic 
disciplines, writes Bourdieu, law has traditionally been classed as a ‘higher faculty’, i.e. one of 
those disciplines whose main social function consists in the training of the various agents of 
political power – priests, doctors, judges – and which for that reason tend to be both ‘the most 
directly controlled’ by the political order and ‘the least autonomous from it’.23 As a result of this 
close relationship of control and dependence, when it comes to the organisation of their 
knowledge-production protocols, the vast majority of juridical disciplines consistently tend to 
gravitate towards ‘what constitutes in Kant’s terms … “the right wing of the parliament of 
knowledge” [which is deference to] authority’.24 A large part of this trend, explains Bourdieu, can 
be traced to the ideas of social licensing and governance through the exercise of authorized 
knowledge:  
 
The competence of the doctor or jurist is a technical competence 
guaranteed by the [state] law, which confers the authority and the 
authorization to use a more or less scientific knowledge: [the wide 
cultural acceptance of the idea of] the subordination of the medical 
researchers to the clinical practitioners expresses this subordination of 
knowledge to social power [very well. For, indeed,] the operation effected 
by Kant’s higher faculties is partly akin to social magic, which, as in 
initiation ceremonies, tends to consecrate a competence which is 
inextricably social and technical. 25 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from law and medicine, according to this theory, stand 
the so-called ‘lower faculties’: history, linguistics, mathematics, literature, etc. These are the 
disciplines, explains Bourdieu, which, having no inherent relationship of symbiosis with political 
power, tend to be both far less controlled by (and implicated in the reproduction of) the existing 
social order and thus also far less enthralled to the idea of disciplinary authority.26 This means that, 
rather than usefulness to the temporal power and social acceptance, it is the ideals of 
                                                 
22 ‘It is through the weight they possess within this structure, more than through the direct [micro-level] interventions 
they may also makes … that the dominant [schools] exert their pressure on the dominated [schools] and on their 
[institutional] strategies: [in effect, they thus] define regularities and sometimes [even change] the rules of the game, 
by imposing the definition of strengths most favourable to their interests and modifying the entire environment of the 
other [schools] and the system of constraints that bear on them or the space of possibles offered to them. The 
distribution of strength governs the distribution of chances of success … through various mechanisms, such as the 
economies of scale or ‘barriers to entry’ resulting from the permanent disadvantage with which [heterodox schools] 
have to cope.’ Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) 195-6. 
23 Bourdieu, Homo Academicu, n.12, at 62.  
24 Ibid., at 63. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., at 62. 
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Enlightenment and analytical rigour – ‘the freedom to examine and to object’ – that are generally 
considered the most treasured values in this instance. Freed from the rule of social control, the 
knowledge-production protocols in such disciplines, observes Bourdieu, are left to be ruled by ‘the 
scholar’s own reason, that is to say, [their] own laws’.27  
What exactly is the relevance of this divergence in knowledge-protocol dynamics for our 
purposes? The answer should not be hard to guess. All higher-faculty disciplines, notes Bourdieu, 
are organized in such a manner as to facilitate the production of a certain cadre of ‘executive 
agents able to put into practice, without questioning or doubting, within the limits of a given social 
order, the techniques and recipes of a body of knowledge which they claim neither to produce nor 
to transform.’28 International law is not an exception in this regard, and the same pattern of 
authority vs. Enlightenment differentiation that organises the distribution of disciplines between 
the higher and lower faculties replicates itself within its internal disciplinary landscape. The closer 
a given tradition of international law moves to the institutional core of the international legal 
discipline, the greater becomes the pressure on it to organise its knowledge protocols in such a 
way as to facilitate the production of ‘mindless executive ants’. The more readily it accepts and 
internalizes this demand, the more difficult it becomes for it to win over the hearts and minds of 
the best and the brightest graduate students: coming over to the orthodox side may improve one’s 
career prospects, but the intellectual life one will lead within those quarters is certainly guaranteed 
to be deadly boring. And every bright student abhors boredom.  
And thus we come to what may be described as the third law of academic capital 
accumulation. The one context in which being removed from the disciplinary core can, ultimately, 
become a source of relative empowerment for  the heterodox disciplinary tradition is the one 
context which frequently matters the most: having distanced itself from the discipline’s centres of 
institutional power, the heterodox tradition does not need to limit itself to the reproduction of an 
intellectual culture guaranteed to supply a cadre of mindless executive ants to help prop up the 
existing social order. Freed from this unappealing burden, it can promise to its recruits something 
they could never hope to find if they joined a long-established orthodoxy: that simple old-
fashioned experience of intellectual freedom that always attracts the greatest and the most 
generous minds of every generation.  
For, there is, after all, something special about international law as a discipline that sets it 
apart from all other legal fields.29 The vast majority of research students who come to international 
law seem to do so not because they are motivated by the promise of a better pay-check or a vastly 
improved social status. For many of them the ability to lead an intellectually fulfilling professional 
life – that ‘freedom to examine and to object’ that Kant and Bourdieu put such a premium on – 
seems to constitute a much more important consideration .The mainstream international law 
tradition, by virtue of its heavy investment in the existing political order, cannot afford the luxury 
of offering such kind of freedom to its members. Its heterodox counterparts, on the other hand, can 
– and in most cases readily do.  
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., at 63. 
29 Cf. David Kennedy, ‘A New World Order: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’ (1994) 4 TLCP 329, at 335. 
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3. NAIL as an Institutional Phenomenon30 
 
 
3.1 Institutional Story: Standard Account  
 
 
The standard account of NAIL’s history – at least as internalised by the movement’s present-
day participants and inheritors31 - revolves around two heavily mythologised narratives. The first 
of these narratives focuses on what is commonly understood to be a long-established divergence 
between the intellectual and the organisational trajectories of NAIL; the second, on the broader 
role of the movement’s ‘ideological leaders’, and in particular David Kennedy, in its establishment 
and evolution.  
At the heart of the first narrative lies the idea – inspired, it seems, to a large degree by 
Duncan Kennedy’s version of the history of the US CLS32 – that there exists, in principle, a 
fundamental distinction between NAIL as an academic movement and NAIL as an intellectual 
tradition. The former phenomenon, it is understood, has had a much shorter lifespan than the 
latter. It also reflected a much greater sense of self-consciousness that has long since dissipated 
and become outmoded. The endpoint of its historical trajectory came sometime around 1998, when 
the so-called ‘fin de NAIL’ conference set out to disband the NAIL movement and retire the NAIL 
moniker.33 Whatever happened under the NAIL rubric after that, on this view of things, 
consequently, can only discussed in terms of the NAIL tradition but not the NAIL movement.  
As could be gleaned from the way I have been using the terms ‘tradition’ and ‘movement’ in 
these pages, I find this argument by and large unconvincing. Firstly, unless one takes an extremely 
subjectivist approach to sociology, to verify the existence of a given social fact one needs to look 
at the patterns of the corresponding social practices before examining whatever self-serving 
accounts about them may have been produced by the interested parties, and the social practices of 
the NAIL community very strongly indicate, in my view, that the NAIL movement did not come 
to an end with the ‘fin de NAIL’ conference. Secondly, I do not think one can really talk of 
intellectual traditions as disembodied ideal realities. Traditions do not exist separately from – or 
outside of – the underlying social realities. If only for this reason alone, I do not find it particularly 
interesting to engage with this aspect of the traditional account of the NAIL history.  
The second standard narrative about NAIL’s institutional career trajectory, by contrast, 
deserves a lot more attention. At the root of this narrative lie a series of implicit but very far-
reaching assumptions that directly concern the object of this inquiry . The most important among 
these assumptions  concerns the question of individual leadership and the importance of personal 
connections.  
                                                 
30 In addition to those already mentioned, I owe my understanding of the institutional evolution of NAIL outlined in 
this section to conversations with Antony Anghie, Hani Sayed, Catriona Drew, Thomas Skouteris, Martti 
Koskenniemi, Susan Marks, Mikhail Xifaras, Matt Craven, Tanya Monforte, Rose Parfitt, B. S. Chimni, Nathaniel 
Berman, Itsuko Higashiuchi, Ileana Porras, Alvaro Santos, Karen Knop, Michael Fakhri, Reut Paz, Boris Mamlyuk, 
Fleur Johns, Owen Taylor, Robert Knox, and Vishaal Kishore.  
31 For further elaboration of this account and its underlying narrative programming, see Rasulov, supra n.23. 
32 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, ‘Afterword’, in Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy 
202, 220 (2004) (CLS is dead as a movement  but ‘still very much alive as a “school” [and a] literature’). Cf. infra n. 
35. 
33 See Thomas Skouteris, ‘Fin de NAIL: New Approaches to International Law and Its Impact on Contemporary 
International Legal Scholarship’ (1997) 10 LJIL at 415; Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box 
n. 1, at 490-1. 
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The basic plotline here unfolds more or less as follows: NAIL’s founding moment as an 
academic movement and an intellectual tradition came at some point in the late 1980s; its central 
institutional site was Harvard Law School. The first tremors which prefigured its emergence had 
taken place several years before that, on the other side of the Atlantic. Even though there had been 
no clearly identifiable institutional locus for the NAIL tradition to crystallize around at that point, 
each of the four scholars who are traditionally identified as part of its ‘founding generation’ – 
David Kennedy, Martti Koskenniemi, Anthony Carty, and Philip Allott – had a strongly 
pronounced European link at the time. Koskenniemi, Carty, and Allott lived and worked in 
Europe; Kennedy had spent several years, after finishing his legal studies, in Germany and then 
worked as a lawyer in Geneva and Brussels. All four had come to international law sharing the 
same broad set of commitments:  to challenge the old boundaries, to transform the established 
knowledge protocols, to open up the field of international legal thought to various elements of the 
continental philosophic tradition, especially those historically favoured by the US CLS movement.  
Three of the four, furthermore, had also brought with them considerable non-academic 
professional experience (Kennedy, Koskenniemi, and Allott). Two of them (Kennedy and Allott) 
had then gone on to teach at universities commonly regarded as part of the global academic elite 
(Harvard and Cambridge). Both had been educated at the same institutions themselves, having 
been taught and mentored into the international legal discipline by the leading international 
lawyers of the previous generation (Robert Jennings, Louis Sohn, Thomas Franck). The academic 
credentials of the other two seemed no less impressive: Carty had received his doctorate from 
Cambridge, Koskenniemi spent some time at Oxford and was otherwise a graduate of one of the 
leading international law schools in northern Europe (Turku).  
All four were male, multilingual, and lawyers by training. All four also shared a strong 
dislike for the NCP, on the one hand, and Myres McDougal’s policy-oriented jurisprudence, on the 
other.  
And yet at first all these synergies did not amount to anything concrete. However many 
commonalities the four founders may have shared in terms of their individual profiles, none of 
them were sufficient to trigger the emergence of a new movement. It was not until Kennedy’s 
Herculean project at Harvard began in earnest that NAIL’s first lineaments started to take form.  
Drawing on his experience with the US CLS movement, by the second half of the 1980s, 
Kennedy began to develop a dense network of inter-personal connections and mentoring 
structures, using his legendary international law course as his central ideological channel and 
primary recruitment platform. Coupled with his gradual rise to prominence within Harvard’s 
internal institutional landscape, this created the necessary foundation for the emergence of the 
NAIL movement.  
By the end of the decade each of the four founding figures went on to publish a trailblazing 
monograph – Carty in 1986, Kennedy in 1987, Koskenniemi in 1989, Allott in 1990 – which 
quickly secured for the newly emerging tradition a continuous presence in the discipline’s  
collective consciousness as well as provided the newly emergent tradition with the first iteration of 
its literary canon. As the first crop of Kennedy’s students began to secure academic jobs, starting 
with the Northeastern in Boston, then gradually expanding elsewhere, whatever doubts may have 
remained before now quickly dissipated: a new movement finally had arrived and at its social and 
institutional centre stood the figure of David Kennedy and his Harvard international law 
programme.  
Over the next decade the founding figures’ axis slowly dissolved. First Carty, then Allott 
gradually moved out of the rapidly expanding NAIL circle. Their place was filled by Kennedy’s 
former students and junior associates: Nathaniel Berman, Karen Engle, Jorge Esquirol, Antony 
Anghie, Ileana Porras, Thomas Skouteris, and various others. By the late 1990s, NAIL scholars 
were busy churning out an ever-increasing  number of books, articles, and conference papers, 
inspiring in the process the emergence of a whole series of variously successfully institutional 
spin-offs, the most highly regarded of which became the TWAIL network.  
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The end of Kennedy’s association with Harvard’s doctoral programme triggered a short 
period of institutional crisis, a partial solution to which was found in the gradual expansion of the 
overseas NAIL network, with Helsinki, London, and Melbourne serving as the movement’s main 
international outposts.  Despite the noted attempt to retire the NAIL moniker in 1998, the 
movement thus continued to evolve and expand. By the mid-2000s, in addition to TWAIL, 
Kennedy’s students and associates went on to set up a series of variously scaled research initiatives 
across Latin America and Western Europe, getting closely involved at some point in the formative 
stages of the European Society of International Law, slowly establishing a presence in the 
Cambridge University Press catalogue, the SOAS law school in London, and the Leiden Journal of 
International Law.  
At all points, however, it was Kennedy’s programme at Harvard that remained the 
movement’s institutional and ideological headquarters. At the end of the 2000s, after a brief hiatus 
that had seen him move to Brown, Kennedy returned to Harvard, to establish a new institutional 
platform for the movement in the shape of the Institute for Global Law and Policy, and, having 
joined forces with the other NAIL teams at Melbourne, London, and the newly set-up English-
speaking Sciences-Po law school in Paris, proceeded to take the NAIL enterprise to an entirely 
new level of institutional politics by aligning it with  the Qatar Foundation-backed international 
law school initiative at Doha.  
 
 
3.2 Institutional Story: General Picture – How the Network Evolved  
 
 
I am not sure to what extent this set of narratives  – I hesitate to call it anything more than 
that – can serve as a sufficiently reliable guide to understanding NAIL’s history and in particular 
its record of intra-disciplinary achievements and failures. It certainly has quite a lot going for it, 
and yet, I remain convinced, if one were looking to develop a genuinely insightful, analytically 
rigorous account of NAIL’s evolution, most of these narratives, ultimately, would have to be set 
aside.   
The account that I would like to offer in their place is based on the theoretical framework 
outlined in Section 2 above.  As a result of this it has a slightly formal structure and appearance, 
and so the easiest way to present it, I thought, would be by organizing it in the form of a table.  
 
General Evolutionary Trajectory of the NAIL Movement 
 
 
Development
al Stage  
Institutional Configuration 
 
Geographical 
Organization 
 
Inception  
(early to 
mid-
1980s) 
• Overall organisational form: a diffuse critical 
impulse derived as much from the theoretical 
reflections on the state of the disciplinary orthodoxy 
as the practical experiences of the founding figures 
outside the academic legal process 
• Human capital structure: the founding figures and 
some junior associates (the demographics is 
predominantly white, male, Western-origined, 
lawyers by training)  
• Main patterns of academic production: separate 
efforts and disparate projects focused around the 
publication of iconoclastic texts and delivery of legal 
education in traditional educational settings (eg 
 
No discernible 
territorial 
centre 
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Harvard JD courses) 
• AC holdings configuration: low stocks of discipline-
specific capital, considerable potential in terms of 
academic and non-academic credentials  
 
 
Emergence 
(mid- to late-
1980s) 
• Overall organisational form: CLS-style ‘project’34 
conceived in part as an extension of the US CLS 
movement  
• Human capital structure: the founding figures and 
the first generation of NAIL scholars (average 
demographic profile: white, gender-balanced, 
Western-origined, lawyers by training) 
• Dominant patterns of academic production: 
iconoclastic books and long articles in US law 
journals; legal education in traditional educational 
settings; CLS-related conferences 
• AC holdings configuration: modest stocks derived 
primarily from the linkage with the US branch of 
CLS and the Harvard JD programme but also the 
extra-academic prestige indicators mobilised through 
the founding figures’ professional credentials  
 
 
Exclusively US-
based with 
Harvard Law 
School as the 
sole central 
node 
First crisis 
(mid- to 
late 
1980s) 
• Repression of US CLS35 causes a temporary freeze in 
the development of the NAIL movement, 
accompanied by a conscious attempt to distance the 
NAIL initiative from the CLS legacy  
 
 
Re-start and 
rise to 
prominen
ce (early 
to mid-
1990s) 
• Overall organisational form: a standalone movement 
conceived as a self-conscious project of destabilising 
the discipline’s established protocols of knowledge 
production   
• Human capital structure: the founding figures, the 
first generation, and the gradually emerging second 
generation (average profile: ethnically mixed, less 
gender-balanced, increasingly Third-World-origined, 
but most participants still come from a 
predominantly legal-educational background) 
• Dominant patterns of academic production: books, 
edited volumes, long and medium-length articles in 
US and European-based law journals; Dighton 
 
Predominantly 
US-based 
with Harvard 
as the sole 
central node 
and the  
Northeastern 
Law School 
(Boston) as 
the main 
secondary 
outpost 
                                                 
34 See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) 6: ‘A project is a 
continuous goal-oriented practical activity based on an analysis of some kind (with a textual and oral tradition), but the 
goals and the analysis are not necessarily internally coherent or consistent over time. It is a collective effort, but all the 
players can change over time … It isn’t a project unless people see it as such, but the way they see it doesn’t exhaust 
what outsiders can say about it.’  
35 For background on this, see further Kennedy, ‘Afterword’, n. 32; Pierre Schlag, U.S. CLS (1999) 10 L&C, at 199, 
204-5.  
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weekends (off-campus, full-participation writing 
workshops);36 large conferences; legal education in 
traditional educational settings with an increasing 
emphasis on graduate training programmes; counter-
disciplinarity as an epistemic project 
• AC holdings configuration: high stocks of local AC 
at Harvard, low diversification of non-territorialised 
discipline-specific and non-discipline specific 
capital, modest bureaucratic capital holdings  
 
Expansion 
and 
dispersio
n (mid- 
to late 
1990s) 
• Overall organisational form: movement as a 
confederacy, crystallisation of explicitly distinct, 
mutually autonomous strands organised along 
thematic and theoretical divisions 
• Human capital structure: same as in previous period 
• Dominant patterns of academic production: long and 
medium-length articles in US and European-based 
law journals; exclusive orientation towards the 
academic legal process; Dighton weekends; large 
conferences, including with participation of members 
of other disciplinary traditions; legal education in 
traditional educational settings with a more strongly 
pronounced accent on graduate training programmes; 
multiple inter- and counter-disciplinarities 
• AC holdings configuration: modest improvement in 
non-territorialised discipline-specific capital 
holdings, further increase in local AC stocks at 
Harvard (but also in Helsinki), low diversification of 
non-discipline specific capital holdings 
 
 
Predominantly 
US-based, 
with a few 
outposts in 
Europe 
(Helsinki, 
London) and 
Harvard as the 
sole central 
node 
Second crisis 
and 
‘rebirth’ 
(late 
1990s to 
mid-
2000s) 
• Overall organisational form: movement in self-
denial, progressive loosening of the confederacy as 
different strands take off on their own  
• Human capital structure: same as before with a 
steady influx of non-lawyers and gender-rebalancing 
• Dominant patterns of academic production: books 
and articles of varying length in European and 
sometimes US-based legal and interdisciplinary 
journals; large-scale conferences without the 
participation of any mainstreamers; legal education 
in traditional educational settings with principal 
focus on graduate programmes; attempts are made to 
turn the project away from an exclusively academic 
orientation; Dighton formula falls into relative 
disuse; radical counter-disciplinarity projects 
replaced by more modest inter-disciplinarity 
 
The Helsinki-
Harvard-
Toronto-
London-
Melbourne 
axis with 
Harvard as the 
first among 
equals  
                                                 
36 On these, see further Rasulov, ‘New Approaches to International Law: Images of a Genealogy’, n. 21, at 161. 
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programmes 
• AC holdings configuration: the weakening of the 
Harvard ELRC basis is offset by the expansion of the 
territorial framework and the parallel diversification 
of the structure of both non-territorialised discipline-
specific and non-discipline specific AC holdings, 
evidenced, inter alia, by the accumulation of new 
prestige indicators and the improvement of 
networking linkages outside the traditional academic 
field  
 
‘The long 
present’  
(mid-2000s 
to the 
present 
day) 
• Overall organisational form: movement as an 
institutional network, the discursive confederacy falls 
apart – ‘many projects, no common theme’ – just as 
in the institutional dimension the old framework is 
re-established and strengthened with the Doha 
project gradually emerging as the new focal point  
• Human capital structure: the third generation of 
NAIL scholars enters the scene (average profile: a lot 
more racially and gender-balanced, strong 
‘European’ and Third Worldist presence, a 
considerable proportion of new players without a 
strong legal educational background or knowledge of 
the ‘traditional’ NAIL/CLS canon)   
• Dominant patterns of academic production: books 
and articles as before; revival of the Dighton 
formula, first,  in the Brown and Harvard IGLP 
settings, subsequently in the IGLP Doha contexts; 
return to exclusive academic orientation; inter-
disciplinarity as a canon; large-scale conferences 
without any mainstreamers; small-scale research 
workshops in numerous formats with strong cross-
disciplinary attendance from economics, history, and 
science-technology-studies (STS); summer schools 
and graduate programmes as the principal 
educational forms and mechanisms of reproduction; 
increased circulation of graduate students and early 
career scholars across the movement’s institutional 
network  
• AC holdings configuration: dispersion of holdings, 
steady increase in ideological, bureaucratic, financial, 
and all forms of discipline-specific AC, stabilisation 
of publishing and publication dispersal networks 
 
 
 
 
Rhizomatic in 
appearance, 
but centred 
along a 
clearly 
recognisable 
axis: Harvard- 
London-Paris-
Doha axis 
 
 
3.3 Institutional Story: Specific Case – NAIL Publishing 
 
 
One can think of many ways to relate the history of an academic movement. The somewhat 
formalised account proposed in the previous section provides a great deal of important insight into 
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the development of NAIL’s institutional trajectories. But it also leaves many interesting details 
out. One possible way to redress this would be to supplement this account with various sets of 
relevant statistics concerning, say, the number of doctoral theses started and defended by NAIL-
associated scholars in different years and in different countries; the total amount of research grants 
and scholarships won; the numbers of publishing contracts secured, professional achievement 
awards received, etc. An exercise of this nature, however, lies beyond the scope of the present 
essay. What I would like to offer in its stead is something slightly different – a relatively narrowly 
focused overview of the principal trends in the evolution of NAIL’s publishing patterns.  
 
i. Early 1980s to mid-1990s.  
 
In the first few years of its existence, NAIL’s chief publishing outlet was undoubtedly the 
Harvard International Law Journal (HILJ). Between 1985 and 1992 HILJ published a whole 
series of classical NAIL articles by Kennedy (1985, 1986, 1990 (with Leo Specht), 1991), James 
Boyle (1985), Gunther Frankenberg (1985), Dan Tarullo (1985), and Nathaniel Berman (1992), as 
well as that famous review essay by Nigel Purvis on critical legal studies in public international 
law.37 Wisconsin International Law Journal provided a home for another two landmark essays 
(Kennedy, Berman), as did also the American University Journal of International Law and Policy 
(Kennedy, Ed Morgan). There were also several notable forays into the Michigan (Karen Engle, 
Anne Orford, Carty, Koskenniemi) and Yale (Berman, Morgan) journal clusters and even a couple 
of odd appearances in the American Journal of International Law (the famous essay on the 
feminist approaches by Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright) and Harvard 
Law Review (Annelise Riles, Berman). Interestingly, unlike Harvard, which was Kennedy’s home, 
and Wisconsin, which was historically linked to the old CLS crowd through David Trubek and 
Mark Tushnet, neither Michigan nor Yale had any obvious personnel connections to NAIL.  
Outside North America, the only notable publishing connection during this period was 
established with the newly founded European Journal of International Law (EJIL). In the first 
three years of its existence EJIL published pieces by all three of European-based NAIL founding 
figures: Koskenniemi (1990), Carty (1991), and Allott (1992). The Nordic Journal of International 
Law and the Finnish Yearbook of International Law also ran a couple of pieces by Koskenniemi 
and Pal Wrange. Beyond this and a few brief appearances in the ASIL Proceedings by Kennedy, 
there seemed to be no obvious patterns to NAIL’s publishing practices. Unable yet to secure any 
lasting editorial appointments, NAIL members at this point seemed to be happy  simply to take 
their publishing opportunities wherever they became available: Texas Law Journal (Kennedy), 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (Carl Landauer), International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (Koskenniemi, Riles), and even Human Rights Quarterly (Kennedy).  
Three of the four classical NAIL monographs released during this period were placed with 
second-rate publishing houses: Carty published The Decay of International Law with Manchester 
University Press; Kennedy, his International Legal Structures with the German-based Nomos; 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia with Finnish lawyers’ publishing corporation. Only 
Allott’s Eunomia was released by a premier international publisher (Oxford).  
 
ii. Mid-1990s to mid-2000s 
 
Starting from the mid-1990s the NAIL-HILJ relationship gradually began to disintegrate.  
Henceforth only TWAIL-related themes could expect to receive any considerable coverage in 
HILJ, a pattern that, nevertheless, led to the publication of a whole series of first-class essays that 
                                                 
37 See Purvis, ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’, n. 7.  
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immediately came to be regarded as an important part of the NAIL canon, with Antony Anghie’s 
Finding Peripheries confidently leading the field.  
Around the turn of the century a few interesting pieces by Kennedy and Anghie (among 
others) appeared in the New York Journal of International Law and Politics, even though the 
NYU, like Yale, had no obviously identifiable NAIL faculty members.38 Utah, on the other hand, 
did, which explains, among other things, the placing in the Utah Law Review of both Kennedy’s 
remarkable 1994 essay on the ‘international style’ and the 1997 special issue on the ‘new 
approaches to comparative law’.  
The turn of the millennium finally witnessed the NAILmovement reaching the proverbial 
Mount Olympus, as a group of high-ranking NAIL participants were delegated the task of 
organising that year’s American Society of International Law conference, which resulted in the 
inclusion of a large number of NAIL papers in that year’s ASIL proceedings. The Michigan cluster 
of journals once again proved attractive (James Gathii in 2000) as did the American University 
journal (Berman in 1999).  
In Europe, in the meantime, the NAIL-EJIL connection that had seemed so promising at the 
start of the decade failed to materialise into anything permanent, save for the occasional 
publication of various short pieces by Koskenniemi now and then. There was a brief period 
sometime around 2000, when it seemed as though NAIL’s new UK-based allies and participants 
had come on the verge of pulling off a strategic break-through: Susan Marks, Gerry Simpson, 
Catriona Drew, Matt Craven, Carty, and Allott all made appearances in the EJIL pages between 
1998 and 2001. But no editorial ‘takeover’ of any kind resulted from that, and soon enough the 
Brit-NAIL invasion had run its course.  
The role that EJIL refused to take went instead at this stage to the Leiden Journal of 
International Law (LJIL), which for a few exciting years around the turn of the millennium, thanks 
in no small part to Thomas Skouteris’s strategic manoeuvring, became NAIL’s principal European 
platform. As other NAIL-related people started to join Skouteris on the LJIL board (Fleur Johns, 
Florian Hoffman), the journal began to release a steady stream of high-quality NAIL-coloured 
articles: Kennedy (1999), Berman (2000), Esquirol (2000), Morgan (2001), Carty (2001), Riles 
(2002), Gathii (2002), Koskenniemi and Leino (2002), Vasuki Nesiah (2003), Skouteris (1998), as 
well as a special 2003 issue on international order (with appearances by a range of NAIL regulars) 
and the landmark symposium on Marxism and international law in 2004. Finally, the Nordic 
Journal of International Law saw a few interesting pieces too, most notably the 1996 review essay 
by Deborah Cass. Outside North America and Europe this period also welcomed the addition to 
the NAIL network of the Australian Yearbook of International Law.  
 
iii. Mid-2000s to present 
 
The mid-2000s brought a brief reactivation of the NAIL-EJIL connection: after the 
Koskenniemi-led 2003 symposium on Alf Ross, 2004 saw the publication of the milestone essay 
on international law and imperialism by B.S. Chimni; 2005, pieces by Fleur Johns and George 
Galindo, the special issue on Philip Allott, and Koskenniemi’s keynote lecture from the inaugural 
conference of the newly established European Society of International Law. This rich run of form, 
however, soon came to an end. More notably, nothing comparable happened on the AJIL end, 
although Engle had a medium-length piece published in 2005. HILJ published a few more 
TWAIL-themed pieces in the early and mid-2000s (Makau Mutua, Arnulf Becker Lorca, Chimni, 
Maximo Langer), as did also LJIL off the back of its four special issues on Alejandro Alvarez 
                                                 
38 It did, however, have Thomas Franck, a long-time friend and supporter of the movement, which might account for 
the relative longevity of the NAIL-NYU link: Morgan had a piece published there already in 1988; Berman in 1992. 
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(2006), T. O. Elias (2008), the Indian tradition of international law (2010), and the League of 
Nations (2011). In addition to that LJIL also ran a series of non-TWAIL NAIL-related pieces 
(Orford, Berman, Craven, Morgan, Marks, Aeyal Gross, Umut Ozsu, Sara Kendall).  
The greatest change to NAIL’s publishing pattern during this period, however, came on the 
front of book publishing. Unlike in the late 1980s, the majority of NAIL-related monographs 
published since 2000 have been placed with leading international publishers: Koskenniemi, Allott, 
Anghie, Karen Knop, Simpson, Orford, Johns, Michael Fakhri, and Becker Lorca all published 
with Cambridge University Press; Marks, Ozsu, and Craven with Oxford University Press; 
Kennedy with Princeton University Press. Another platform for NAIL-related monographs was 
found in the Koskenniemi-edited Erik Castren institute series at Brill (Outi Korhonen, Kerry 
Rittich, Reut Paz, Rene Uruena).  
Since 2010, the main trends have included a combination of (i) a general pattern of diffusion 
at the journal level – beyond the occasional revivals of the LJIL and HILJ ‘traditions’, there do not 
seem to be any clear institutional linkages anymore, though the Finnish and Australian yearbooks 
continue to attract a steady stream of NAIL-inspired writings; (ii) the establishment of what to all 
intents and purposes seem to be designed as NAIL’s ‘in-house’ publications (eg, London Review 
of International Law); and (iii) the continuous investment of ideological resources into the CUP 
connection at the level of monograph-production.  
 
 
4. By Way of an Afterword: NAIL’s Lessons for a General Theory of Critical International 
Law 
 
 
There are many stories one could tell about the NAIL movement and its place in the history 
of heterodox international legal studies. Some of them have already been told;39 others still await 
their occasion. Comparing NAIL’s basic trajectory as an academic tradition with those of the other 
notable 20th-century international legal heterodoxies – the New Haven school, Kelsen’s pure 
theory of law, Tunkin’s Marxist positivism – it seems possible to distinguish five basic patterns 
that have consistently characterized its institutional career choices but which have not at the same 
time been replicated on the same scale by those other traditions. Whatever relationship may exist 
between these patterns and NAIL’s greater record of intra-disciplinary success, remains, of course, 
still to be explained and conclusively demonstrated. For what it is worth, however, it seems to me 
that any future movement seeking to make a successful entry into international law’s broader 
disciplinary landscape as part of its heterodox wing would certainly do very well not to ignore any 
potential lessons these patterns may imply.  
 
How Critique Works: The Patterns of Success and Survival for Heterodox Movements in 
Contemporary International Law 
 
(i) Partial dispersion of the organisational dynamics:  
• Institutional integration around one clearly identifiable axis of decision-making centres 
helps make the process of academic capital accumulation run more efficiently. The dynamics of 
consistent centralisation, however, should not extend to the field of discursive and epistemic 
protocols.  
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box’ n.1, at 476-500; Rasulov, ‘New 
Approaches to International Law: Images of a Genealogy’, n. 21; Skouteris, ‘Fin de NAIL: New Approaches to 
International Law and Its Impact on Contemporary International Legal Scholarship’, n. 33.  
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• A network built around a geographically spread-out institutional structure has better 
chances of surviving any kind of large-scale intra-disciplinary crisis than a network focused 
around one single central node.  
 
(ii) ‘Smart diversification’: 
• Every heterodox movement ought to diversify its academic capital holdings as far as 
possible. Not all diversification solutions, however, are equally optimal. All things being equal, in 
the short to medium term it pays more to invest into the development of the movement’s logistical 
bases and bureaucratic resources.  
• The development of stable publishing and output dispersal networks and the accumulation 
of external prestige indicators are the two key preconditions for the movement’s ability to benefit 
from the second law of academic capital accumulation.  
• To make the second law of academic capital accumulation work, the heterodox movement 
sooner or later should ‘storm the citadel’: whoever gains control of the discipline’s main 
institutional sites - the leading graduate programmes, governance of the learned societies, editorial 
boards – will control the terms of resource convertibility for everyone else. 
• Funding trumps everything – except for the third law of academic capital accumulation. 
Boredom kills student recruitment. 
• Recruitment only produces results when it is coupled with a smart strategy of social 
reproduction: putting in place something similar to the Dighton model will yield far better results 
than securing control over the design of the first-year curriculum if the final aim is to produce a 
community of professional intellectuals. 
 
(iii) Exclusive academic orientation:  
• Periodic forays into the realm of public media always pay off, and establishing links with 
diplomatic and legal practice communities will never hurt any disciplinary tradition, but in the end, 
for every heterodoxy, the game is always won (and lost) on the academic institutional turf. 
• Targeting the operation of graduate programme is the most cost-effieicnt strategy under 
conditions of academic capital shortage.  
• Small-scale research workshops work best when the main objective is to ensure the 
cultivation of internal social links and the training of the next generation of heterodox scholars, but 
nothing in the end compares to large-scale conferences when it comes to the accumulation of de-
territorialised forms of academic capital.  
• Heterodoxies should not aim to write for the mass market until they have stabilised 
themselves in institutional and financial terms. The most effective publishing strategy at the 
earliest stages is only to target professional academic audiences, opening up to inter-disciplinary 
linkages wherever it makes strategic sense.  
 
(iv) Territorialised circulation of practices  
• Every tradition, school, or movement exists only through its practices. When it comes to 
the organisation of its research and conferencing circuits, the wider the geographical framework 
the movement is able to cover, the better. 
• Repetition is the parent of ideological entrenchment. The more regularized the circulation 
of the movement’s membership base across its constituent institutional nodes becomes, the more 
entrenched the movement’s practices will become; the more institutionalised, correspondingly, the 
movement itself is going to be in terms of its intra-disciplinary presence. 
 
(v) Demographic diversification 
• Building an academic movement is similar to building a political party. The more 
diversified the movement’s membership base becomes, the better chances it will have of spreading 
its influence and reproducing itself across different locales and generations. 
